FileRise Default Encryption Key Vulnerability Allows Token Forgery and Configuration Decryption

A vulnerability exists in FileRise, a self-hosted web file manager and WebDAV server, in versions prior to 3.9.0. The issue arises from a hardcoded default encryption key, 'default_please_change_this_key', used for all cryptographic operations, including HMAC token generation, AES configuration encryption, and session tokens. This flaw enables any unauthenticated attacker to forge upload tokens for arbitrary file uploads to shared folders and decrypt admin configuration secrets, such as OIDC client secrets and SMTP passwords. The vulnerability is present because FileRise uses a single key, 'PERSISTENT_TOKENS_KEY', for all cryptographic operations, with the default value hardcoded in the Dockerfile and config files. Unless the deployer explicitly changes the key, the default is used, leaving the application vulnerable.

Impact

Exploitation of this vulnerability allows for unauthorized file uploads to shared folders and the decryption of sensitive admin configuration secrets, including OIDC client and SMTP credentials. Additionally, there is a theoretical risk of session hijacking by forging remember-me tokens, but this would require a separate vulnerability to write to the tokens file.

Reproduction

The vulnerability can be reproduced by deploying FileRise using the default Docker image without changing the persistent tokens key. Once the application is running, an admin can create a shared folder with upload enabled, generating a share upload token. An attacker can then forge a valid upload token using the default encryption key and upload files to the shared folder without authentication. This process can be automated with a Python script that replicates the token forging and file upload steps.

Remediation

Users can upgrade to FileRise version 3.9.0 or later, where this vulnerability has been fixed. Instructions for updating are available in the FileRise documentation.