OpenClaw Authentication Bypass Vulnerability in Trusted-Proxy Control UI Pairing

An authentication bypass vulnerability has been identified in OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25. The issue arises in the trusted-proxy Control UI pairing mechanism, which accepts the client identifier 'control-ui' without adequate device identity verification. This vulnerability allows an authenticated websocket client with a node role to exploit the bypass by using the 'control-ui' client ID to circumvent pairing requirements, thereby gaining unauthorized access to node event execution flows.

Impact

Exploitation of this vulnerability creates an authorization boundary bypass, allowing a node-scoped connection to access node event execution flows without completing the required pairing process.

Reproduction

To reproduce this vulnerability, connect a websocket client with an authenticated node role to an OpenClaw server version prior to 2026.2.25. Include the 'x-forwarded-user' header with a value of 'peter@example.com' and the 'x-forwarded-proto' header set to 'https'. Once connected, send a request to the 'status' RPC method. The response should indicate a missing scope error, confirming the bypassed authentication. Afterward, send a request to the 'health' RPC method, which should succeed, demonstrating unauthorized access to node event execution flows.

Remediation

Users can upgrade to OpenClaw version 2026.2.25 or later to address this vulnerability.